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Abstract
This paper reports on income generation practices among civil servants in the health sector, with
a particular emphasis on dual practice. It first approaches the subject of public–private overlap.
Thereafter it focuses on coping strategies in general and then on dual practice in particular.
To compensate for unrealistically low salaries, health workers rely on individual coping strategies.
Many clinicians combine salaried, public-sector clinical work with a fee-for-service private clientele.
This dual practice is often a means by which health workers try to meet their survival needs,
reflecting the inability of health ministries to ensure adequate salaries and working conditions.
Dual practice may be considered present in most countries, if not all. Nevertheless, there is
surprisingly little hard evidence about the extent to which health workers resort to dual practice,
about the balance of economic and other motives for doing so, or about the consequences for the
proper use of the scarce public resources dedicated to health.
In this paper dual practice is approached from six different perspectives: (1) conceptual, regarding
what is meant by dual practice; (2) descriptive, trying to develop a typology of dual practices; (3)
quantitative, trying to determine its prevalence; (4) impact on personal income, the health care
system and health status; (5) qualitative, looking at the reasons why practitioners so frequently
remain in public practice while also working in the private sector and at contextual, personal life,
institutional and professional factors that make it easier or more difficult to have dual practices; and
(6) possible interventions to deal with dual practice.
Introduction
Doctors and nurses in government employment are
labelled "unproductive", "poorly motivated", "ineffi-
cient", "client-unfriendly", "absent" or even "corrupt".
These labels are often associated with coping strategies
associated with widespread "demotivation", due partly to
"unfair public salaries". These are presented as the de facto
justification of "inevitable" predatory behaviour and pub-
lic-to-private brain drain [1-6]. In many countries, devel-
oped and developing alike, this has eroded the implicit
psychological and social contracts that underlie the civil
service values of well-functioning public organizations
[7]. As a result, public servants often resort to dual or mul-
tiple employment.
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This paper reports on income generation practices among
civil servants in the health sector, with a particular empha-
sis on dual practice. It first approaches the subject of pub-
lic–private overlap. Thereafter it focuses on coping
strategies in general and on dual practice in particular.
Public–private overlap
Private providers capture a significant and growing share
of the service delivery market for health care, and ensure
an important part of the uptake of services. For a sample
of 40 developing countries, an average of 55% of physi-
cians worked in the private sector and an average of 28%
of health care beds were private beds (21% private, for
profit) [8].
Asia has more than 60% of private sector contributions to
health care financing (excluding China and India) and is
the part of the world where the private sector normally
plays the dominant role. In Malaysia, for example, the
proportion of physicians in private practice increased
from 43% in 1975 to 70% in 1990. In Indonesia half of
the hospitals are privately run. In Thailand the share of
beds in private hospitals grew from 5% in 1970 to 14% in
1989.
The contribution of the private sector to health care
financing in Africa is 50%, with a significant preponder-
ance of private, not-for-profit, nongovernmental (PNFP-
NGO) entities, particularly church organizations. In Zim-
babwe church missions provide nearly 70% of all beds in
rural hospitals and in Tanzania they run 40% of the hos-
pitals. In Kenya, about one third of the total health serv-
ices and 40%–50% of the family planning services are
provided by PNFP-NGOs. In Latin America the private
sector finances 40% to 60% of the health sector [9].
For many populations, especially in rural areas, these
PNFP-NGOs are the main – if not the only – providers of
health care. For example, in a mail survey of 88 non-
governmental hospitals in sub-Saharan Africa at the end
of the 1980s, 39 were the only service provider in their dis-
trict [10,11]. It is also the case, for example, of rural Congo
in the 1990s, where only NGO-supported districts contin-
ued working [12]. Following the reforms of the early
1990s in Mali, most ambulatory health care – nearly all in
rural areas – is now provided by community-owned PNFP
health centres organized in a nongovernmental federation
[13]. But these are mainly rural situations.
In urban areas PNFP-NGOs usually share the work with
private, for-profit (PFP) providers and government serv-
ices. In Alexandra, South Africa – a poor periurban town-
ship – for example, a PNFP university clinic, a municipal
clinic and PFP "general dispensing cash practices" worked
side by side [14,15]. But in general, the market share of
private providers is more limited.
PFP health providers are no doubt an important source of
ambulatory care throughout the developing world, but
tend to concentrate on the more profitable niches of the
market. The development of private practice in most
developing countries is notoriously unregulated. Private
practices are not easily forthcoming with information, at
times for fear of tax implications, at times because existing
regulations are not respected, often because of a lack of
respect for discredited ministries of public health and not
infrequently because of the non-existence of information
systems. In transitional countries, such as Tunisia, the
growth of the entrepreneurial sector is well documented.
Although hard data are hard to come by for the poorer
countries, it is sufficient to walk around Luanda or Dar es
Salaam or to look at the advertising sections of any news-
paper in Maputo to see that private health care provision
is a thriving growth industry. If there are ever more private
providers on the market, not all provide the whole range
of health services. They tend to select niches according to
demand and competition rather than providing compre-
hensive care.
There are huge differences between and within countries.
This (patchy and scarce) evidence confirms that both PFP
and PNFP providers have a significant and growing share
of the market of health care, but this statement needs
qualification. There are wide differences between and
within countries. Overall, the market share of the private
sector is smaller for inpatient than for ambulatory care,
and limited for preventive and public health services [8].
Coping strategies
Individual coping strategies represent the health profes-
sionals' ways of dealing with unsatisfactory living and
working conditions. In many countries their prevalence
has increased over recent years. The notion of the full-time
civil servant exclusively dedicated to his/her public sector
job is disappearing. Were this without consequences for
the performance of the public health sector, it would not
be much of a problem. Not all coping strategies can be
classified as predatory behaviour or corruption, and their
effects on the health care system can be positive as well as
negative. They cannot, however, be ignored as, in many
countries – particularly the poorest – the situation has
gotten out of hand.
Most would agree that public sector salaries are most often
"unfair". For example, in 1999 a Mozambican nurse's sal-
ary was only 10% to 15% of what it had been 15 years
before [16]. In Sierra Leone most health professionals,
physicians included, are employed by the public sector atHuman Resources for Health 2004, 2:14 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/2/1/14
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salaries under USD 100 per month [17]. In many other
countries health staff is going through similar experiences.
In Russia, state doctors earn between USD 15 and USD 50
per month [18]. In the Dominican Republic, in 1996,
physicians with 20 years of experience earned the same as
new medical graduates, rewards for good performance
were impossible and personnel were paid regardless of
whether they performed their duties [19]. In such a con-
text, demotivation, overall lack of commitment and low
productivity are to be expected.
To compensate for unrealistically low salaries, health
workers rely on individual coping strategies [1-6,18,20-
54]. Many clinicians combine salaried public sector clini-
cal work with a fee-for-service private clientele [3-6,25-
29,32,38-41,44,45,53]. Others resort to absenteeism
[24,44,45], or predatory behaviour, asking under-the-
counter payments for access to services intended to be free
of charge [33,34,46] or goods and/or misappropriating
drugs or other supplies [20,21,27,43,49] and referral of
public sector patients to private practices [23].
In Thailand 37% of patients pay their public sector obste-
tricians "gratitude money" [55]. In France, mainly for sur-
gical interventions, under-the-table remuneration is very
common in hospital or ambulatory settings [56]. In
Greece, doctors and nurses have been criticized for receiv-
ing gifts and bribes [57].
Another example is fee splitting, whereby a specialist
shares a fee with the referring physician [23]. In 1998, for
example, a group of Italian general practitioners was sus-
pended for accepting payments to send their patients to a
particular private centre for radiology examinations [58].
It is common practice in the United Kingdom for consult-
ants to spend time in private clinics when they should be
attending to their public duties [23].
Patients and practitioners may collude to deceive a third
agent: in Kazakhstan, for example, it is reported that doc-
tors regularly provide false health reports in return for a
fee, so that patients can obtain driving licenses [23]. A fur-
ther form of fraud through misinformation is exemplified
by the case of the English GP who forged consent forms
for patient participation in medical trials in order to boost
income [53]. The problems these coping strategies create
are increasingly recognized [6,38-40]., although the sub-
ject remains taboo for many ministries of health and
development agencies.
Drugs are – in the current context of scarce resources,
health care reform, promotion of generics, the HIV epi-
demic and growing demand for health care – a sensitive
issue, as in many low-income countries, pharmaceuticals
make up 50% or more of health care costs [59]. With
health sector reforms, private sector pharmacies are
increasingly becoming the first and sometimes the only
outlet for the delivery of health services [60-63]. In this
environment, and for several reasons – including the
"business profession dilemma" in private pharmacy prac-
tice – irrational prescription can become a major problem
[64-67]. Antibiotics are often sold without a prescription
[68,69].
In other settings, such as hospitals and health centres,
misappropriation is a widespread practice by all categories
of professionals. This is infrequently acknowledged
explicitly or documented, even in studies that have looked
into the coping strategies of health professionals [3-
5,28,29,41,44,45]. It has nevertheless been documented
in a number of African [20,21,27,43,49] and Latin Amer-
ican countries [22]. Where documented it is perceived as
common practice.
In Uganda, for example, misuse of pharmaceuticals was
reported by facility health workers as well as by the Dis-
trict Health Teams and the Health Unit Management
Committees; resale of drugs represented the greatest single
source of income for health workers in most units [27,43].
In many other developing countries the situation is sup-
posed to be similar if not worse.
Dual practice
We have stated that many clinicians combine salaried
public-sector clinical work with a fee-for-service private
clientele [3-6,25-29,32,38-41,44,45,53]. Dual practice
may be considered present in most countries, if not all.
Nevertheless, there is surprisingly little hard evidence
about the extent to which health care workers resort to
dual practice, about the balance of economic and other
motives for doing so, or about the consequences for the
proper use of the scarce public resources dedicated to
health. Dual practice is often a means by which health
workers try to meet their survival needs, reflecting the ina-
bility of health ministries to ensure adequate salaries and
working conditions.
In this paper dual practice is approached from six different
perspectives: (1) conceptual, regarding what is meant by
dual practice; (2) descriptive, trying to develop a typology
of dual practices; (3) quantitative, trying to determine its
prevalence; (4) impact on personal income, the health
care system and health status; (5) qualitative, looking at
reasons for its prevalence and for staying in public practice
while working in the private sector and at contextual, per-
sonal life, institutional and professional factors that make
it easier or more difficult to have dual practices; and (6)
possible interventions to deal with dual practice.Human Resources for Health 2004, 2:14 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/2/1/14
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What is meant by dual practice
Dual practice is approached in the literature with great
diversity. It can mean health professionals with multiple
specializations – for example, among Egyptian physicians
the most popular areas of multiple specializations are
"cardiology and internal medicine, internal medicine and
fever and cardiology and chest" [70].
It can also mean health professionals working within dif-
ferent paradigms of health (allopathic medicine com-
bined with traditional medicine – Chinese, African or
otherwise – or with other paradigms such as osteopathy,
homeopathy and others). It may involve combining dif-
ferent forms of health-related practice – clinical with
research, with teaching or with management. It can also
mean health professionals combining their professional
health practice with an economic activity not related to
health (such as agriculture).
In this paper, dual practice will be used to describe multi-
ple health-related practices in the same or different sites.
An operational typology of dual practices
Therefore, in terms of sector location, dual practice may
be public on public, public on private or private on pri-
vate (Table 1).
Overtime may be considered a form of dual employment.
It is increasing because of cost-containment measures or
shortages of staff. In 1992, the German Union of Salaried
Employees estimated that the overtime worked by health
workers was equivalent to 20 000 extra full-time staff
posts. Today, trade unions in Canada and the United
Kingdom express particular concern about the use of over-
time to substitute for recruitment and about the increase
in unpaid overtime [71].
The extent of dual practice
As mentioned and supported by the limited literature
available (Table 2), dual practice is probably present in all
countries regardless of income, even in settings – such as
China – where there are major regulatory restrictions
[29,55,70,72-82]. In Latin America physicians usually
hold jobs in both public/social security and private sys-
tems [83].
The impact of dual practice
Predatory behaviour
Dual practice may lead to predatory behaviour (behaviour
in which self-gain is pursued to the detriment of the legit-
imate interests of colleagues, services and/or patients)[84]
by health workers. This is particularly strong in situations
where market conditions – usually high physician supply,
as is the case of capital cities in Africa and other urban
more than rural areas – would otherwise reduce their
incomes. In these situations clinicians use their authority
to prescribe treatment for their patients to generate addi-
tional demand for their own services.
This hypothesis, controversial for some practices such as
caesarean sections, seems consensual regarding other sur-
gical practices [85]. In Thailand, for example, it is well
demonstrated that antenatal care is sought in private
ambulatory facilities, while caesarean sections are offered
in public hospital facilities. Caesarean-section rates
among private patients (46%) are three times higher than
among non-private patients (16%), which indicates that
private practice by public obstetricians is a strong determi-
nant of caesarean sections [55].
The predatory behaviour of individual clinicians consti-
tutes, in many cases, a de facto financial barrier to access
to health care [21]. More important, in the long run, is
that it delegitimizes public sector health service delivery
and jeopardizes the necessary relation of trust between
user and provider [20].
Conflicts of interest
A more insidious problem is that of conflicts of interest.
Effects on the system can best be looked at separately for
each type of side activity. When health officials set up in
dual practice to improve their living conditions – or
merely to make ends meet – this may not interfere with
their work as civil servants (although it is likely to com-
pete for time and to reinforce rural-to-urban migration).
When they take up teaching as an extra job, usually in
public sector institutions, that may actually be beneficial
to the public agenda, as it reinforces the contact of trainees
with the realities of the health services.
For doctors who are basically managers, moonlighting in
private practice presents less of a conflict of interest than
for clinicians. The latter must compete for patients with
themselves, and thus they have an incentive (and the
opportunities) to lower the quality of the care they pro-
vide in the public services. This is not the case for manag-
ers: involvement in NGO projects or work for donors can
foster better coordination in the provision of services, but
Table 1: Typologies of dual practice
Public Private, 
for-profit
Private, not-
for-profit
Public + + +
Private, for-profit + +
Private, not-for-profit +Human Resources for Health 2004, 2:14 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/2/1/14
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may constitute a conflict of interest when NGO or project
policies are not necessarily congruent with national
health policies or the agenda of the public service
[4,44,52,55].
Other business activities, such as agriculture, are neutral
towards health services, although they may constitute a de
facto internal brain drain [3].
Brain drain
Dual practice is to a large extent a question of creating and
making use of opportunities. The pursuit of such opportu-
nities contributes also to brain drain.
Brain drain of health professionals is often thought of
only in terms of intercountry migration [86]. But failure to
post and retain the right person at the right place is not
merely a question of a Congolese doctor's deciding to
move to South Africa or a Philippine nurse's moving to
the United States. It is also a question of internal – includ-
ing public to private sector – "migration".
This public-to-private migration compounds the rural-to-
urban migration because cities also offer more opportuni-
ties to diversify income generation [28,29]. The need to
make up for inadequate salaries – and to be in a setting
where there are opportunities to do so – thus fuels rural-
to-urban migration and resistance against redeployment
to rural areas [4,28,29]. Professionals who have success-
fully taken advantage of these urban opportunities
increase their market value over time, until they are ready
to leave public service. Rural-to-urban brain drain thus is
later compounded by public-to-private brain drain.
Competition for time and limits to access
Coping strategies, including dual practice, also affect
access, but through competition for time. In many coun-
tries, civil service medical staff is available only nominally
full-time to fulfil its assigned tasks. This has been well
described regarding Colombia, Costa Rica and Venezuela.
In Venezuela doctors and head nurses missed about one
third of their contracted service hours, 37% and 30%
respectively, while resident doctors and nurses were
absent about 7% and 13% of the time, respectively [47].
In Peru 32% of doctors and nurses considered absentee-
Table 2: The extent of dual practice in several countries
Country Type and frequency of dual practice
Angola Dual (public and private) practice is ubiquitous and unregulated [72].
Cambodia Dual (public and private) practice is ubiquitous [89].
Egypt Rural-based Egyptian physicians in private practice are more likely to have a second job (85%) than urban-based physicians 
(71%). However, there is not much difference between urban and rural physicians in the likelihood of having a third or fourth 
job: 15% of urban and 11% of rural physicians have a third job and 2% of urban and 1% of rural physicians have a fourth job. 
Twenty percent of 113 single private practice dentists work only in their private clinic; 73% have 2 jobs, 6% have 3 jobs and 
1% have 4 jobs. Among 261 pharmacists 91% have only one job, 8% have two jobs and 1% have 3 jobs. Among 80 other health 
service providers, mainly unlicensed, who are officially not allowed to operate, but yet provide a significant amount of health 
care, 66% of the sample have a second job and 1% has a third job [70].
Indonesia Most doctors have dual practices in the public and private sectors [77].
Malawi The government allows serving medical personnel in its facilities to set up private surgeries where they can practice after 
official duty hours; it further allows those without professional qualifications (e.g. "paramedics") to set up a health care 
business for minor health complaints [78].
Mozambique Common among urban, but not rural, health professionals [29].
Papua New Guinea Semi-private wards in public facilities are well patronized in the larger hospitals but tend to be underutilised in the smaller 
provincial centres [79].
Peru Almost all physicians have both public and private practices [77].
Portugal 23% of public sector health centre workers have a second job, the highest rate being for doctors – 43%; 58% of public sector 
hospital workers have a second job, the highest rate being for doctors – 50% [75, 76,75, 76].
South Africa Half of general practitioners in private practice have other employment. While 36% worked in the public sector, this was 
more common in rural (62%) compared with urban (21%) areas [80].
Syria Most physicians have dual practice [77].
Thailand An estimate suggested that in Bangkok alone there were over 2000 private clinics, many of these run by government doctors 
[81]. Private practice by public sector obstetricians is very frequent [55].
Viet Nam Most doctors complement public sector work with private practice [77]. Full-time government employees are supplementing 
their incomes through part-time private practice. One village-based health survey found that 70% of the drug sellers were 
moonlighting government workers [82].Human Resources for Health 2004, 2:14 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/2/1/14
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ism common or very common [24]. In Costa Rica 65% of
doctors and 87% of nurses felt that physicians were unjus-
tifiably absent from work or, even if present at work, often
saw private patients on public time in public facilities
[22]. Absenteeism in the hospitals of Bogotá, Colombia,
may cost over USD 1 million a year [35].
If public sector medical staff is moonlighting in private
practice, this evidently limits access by public patients.
This corresponds to a net flow of resources out of the pub-
lic sector. Competition for time is also something that
concerns managers, whose coping strategies are often
more oriented towards collaboration with development
agencies [44,45].
Competition for time is a nagging problem for many
development agencies and ministries of health. At times it
is blatant. In Mali, for example, regional health staff was
found to spend 34% of its total working time in (income-
generating) workshops and supervision missions sup-
ported by international agencies; for chief medical officers
it was 48% (El Abassi & Van Lerberghe, unpublished data,
1995). The 73% of working time spent on official duties
that was self-reported by the respondents to one of the
surveys reviewed may well be an overly optimistic esti-
mate [44,45].
In Egypt the number of hours worked in the private clinic
falls as the number of a physician's jobs increases, indicat-
ing that the physician replaces hours away from the pri-
vate clinic with other employment. Secondly, as the
number of jobs increases, the amount of time spent in the
second job, usually a government job, decreases. This
reduces the access of low-income people to medical care,
as they cannot afford to seek care in the private sector.
Econometric analysis of the data also found that physi-
cians replace hours they should be working at the govern-
ment job by hours in the private clinic. This has important
policy implications, as multiple employment is not
increasing the access of the population to medical care.
On average, physicians see one patient per hour in their
private clinic. This increases to 3.2 patients per hour in the
second job, 4.4 in the third job and 2.9 in the fourth job.
An extreme example is that of general practitioners who
see one patient per hour in their private clinic, approxi-
mately four in the second job and 12 in their third job. In
general, the number of patients seen per hour increases
with the job number. This is true for physicians as well as
dentists [70].
Competition for time automatically results in a transfer of
salary resources out of the public sector through reduced
availability – at least the equivalent of 27% of the salary
mass [44,45].
Outflow of resources
Besides competition for time, in many cases the use of the
public sector's means of transportation, office infrastruc-
ture and personnel represent additional hidden outflows
of resources, often in association with dual practice. The
overall impact of this outflow of resources is hard to quan-
tify in any country. Reports from Moscow suggest that up
to 30% of the federal budget is not accounted for [18,34];
in the United Kingdom, estimates of GBP 115 million are
given for prescription fraud alone [23].
The loss to the public sector associated with redirection of
diagnostic and therapeutic resources, such as pharmaceu-
ticals, to private practice or into the black market is obvi-
ously difficult to assess. In Uganda, for example, it results
in a significant loss to the public health facilities: the
median drug leakage in health facilities was estimated at
78% [27,43]. In the Dominican Republic, almost one
third of total hospital expenditure remains unaccounted
for, representing some combination of theft of materials
and supplies, diversion of funds and gross mismanage-
ment [37]. In Panama, high-value medications were sto-
len on a daily basis, with significant losses to the hospital
[87]. In Venezuela, between 10% and 13% of all medical
supplies and medications were stolen [47].
In Costa Rica, 71% of doctors and 83% of the nurses
reported that equipment and materials had been stolen in
their hospital [22]. In the United Kingdom it is estimated
that pilfering – of bandages, medications and stationery,
for example – adds up to more than GBP 15 million annu-
ally. In an Andalusian hospital in Spain, it was estimated
that pilfering of food supplies led to per capita catering
costs that were higher than those of a good restaurant
[23]. The ultimate purpose of this stealing is not studied,
but it is possible to speculate that many stolen resources
find their way into the dual practices of public servants.
Competition for time and transfer of resources are com-
pounded by the fact that the best-trained and most com-
petent officials are also the most likely to divert their time
to other activities outside the health sector (a de facto
brain drain). This in turn reinforces the attraction of what
starts out as a job-on-the-side, and quickly becomes not
only more rewarding financially but also professionally
and in terms of social prestige.
The impact of these coping strategies is seen as negative.
These strategies weaken the public sector health structure
and damage people's health [20,88].
Impact on income
Individual income topping-up strategies allow profession-
als a standard of living that is closer to what they expect.
In one study, these strategies more than doubled theHuman Resources for Health 2004, 2:14 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/2/1/14
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median income of public sector health managers, and
brought it from 20% to 42% of that of a full-time private
practice [44,45] (Tables 3 and 4. Fig. 1: The box-plot chart
represents for each variable the maximum, 75th percen-
tile, 25th percentile and the minimum [,45].)
In Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 90% of a physician's income
in dual practice is derived from the private sector activity
[89]. In Thailand earnings from private practice among
physicians constitute 55% of their total income [55]. The
upside is that income topping-up helps to retain valuable
expertise in public service [90-96].
Corruption in the health sector
Corruption has been a long-standing concern in develop-
ment circles. The literature is rich on theories ranging
from macrosociological analyses of sociocultural proc-
esses to dyadic game theory modelling. Although impres-
sive, this theorizing has not resulted in useful, empirically
validated tools to redress this problem [97].
For these reasons, we prefer to understand this issue from
the perspective of the context that expects health profes-
sionals to have a standard of living that cannot be met by
existing social systems, sometimes to a level where they
cannot even satisfy their basic needs through their public
sector salary.
In Mozambique, for example, medical students seem to
know they will be needed in the public sector, and that
this would represent an opportunity to contribute to the
public's welfare. Nevertheless, in order to improve their
earnings their expectations are to combine their public
sector practice with private medical work. One third of the
medical students expect an income of between USD 715
and USD 1071 a month, and another third expects over
USD 1429, at a time when the salary of a newly graduated
doctor is about USD 357 a month. This sets the scene for
the reality, often unregulated, of dual practice that plagues
many countries [98]. It is not surprising that once gradu-
ated they resort to dual practice (often already initiated as
medical students).
One must distinguish between individual coping strate-
gies and orchestrated activities, acknowledging, neverthe-
less, that they may be closely interrelated. For example,
hospitals with limited budgets in Mozambique, Portugal,
Russia and other countries see dual practice as a means of
retaining the most senior personnel.
There is a fine line separating coping strategies, including
dual practice, from corruption. The difficulty in differenti-
ating between the two starts with the definition of corrup-
tion. Widely accepted definitions often have ideological
connotations. The definition of corruption as the "private
use of public goods" is frequently associated with authors
who ultimately defend a greater role for the private sector
in the provision of public services such as education and
health (as proposed by Van der Geest) [21], but without
sufficient evidence of its effectiveness. They fail to
Table 3: Median and interquartile range of take-home salaries of civil servant health service managers
Low-income countries 
(61 respondents)
Middle-income countries 
(39 respondents)
In USD at official exchange rate 3802 (2137–5249) 11 253 (6704–18 900)
In USD corrected for purchasing power parity 13 890 (9411–20 956) 26 376 (18 416–38 931)
As % of the income of a private practice serving 15 patients per day 14% (10%–33%) 29% (22%–41%)
As % of the income of full-time consultancy work (250 days / year) 31% (23%–44%) 81% (45%–108%)
Source: [44, 45]
Table 4: Median and interquartile range of total income (salary plus extra activities) of civil servant health service managers
Low-income countries 
(61 respondents)
Middle-income countries 
(39 respondents)
In USD at official exchange rate 5899 (2712–8137) 11 372 (6000–23 040)
In USD corrected for purchasing power parity 21 438 (4081–84 640) 39 377 (26 149–64 338)
As % of the income of a private practice serving 15 patients a day 26% (17%–52%) 42% (29%–64%)
As % of the income of full-time consultancy work (250 days/year) 49% (30%–96%) 115% (74%–172%)
Source: [44, 45]Human Resources for Health 2004, 2:14 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/2/1/14
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acknowledge that corruption in the private sector may be
a significant problem [99] and that liberalization and
transition from state-controlled systems to systems in
which the market plays a greater role have often resulted
in more corruption, not less [100].
Another problem with current research is its treatment of
corruption as something that would be the same every-
where, with essentially the same causes and implications
wherever it occurs [101].
A third problem is that of the moralistic and criminal con-
notations of the word "corruption". It should be kept in
mind that not all that is illegal is corrupt and not all that
is corrupt is illegal, and that also a distinction should be
maintained between corrupt transactions and those that
are immoral [99].
The literature tends to focus on the "corrupt", failing to
acknowledge that contexts that generate so-called corrupt
behaviours generate them across the whole spectrum of
society, to the extent that they become an ingrained and
acceptable part of society, a necessary evil to survive in a
very harsh environment. This shift from focusing on the
persons involved to the system in which the professionals
are integrated has taken place in other areas, such as in
quality management [102] and in the prevention and
control of industrial accidents [103] or medical errors
[104]. Sooner or later this is likely to happen with the cor-
ruption literature as well.
Corruption has a negative impact on development in gen-
eral. It hits the poor the hardest, directly and indirectly by,
inter alia, reducing their access to public services such as
education and health care [105,106].
Distribution of income in USD purchasing power parity, with the increase from extra jobs, compared to distribution of poten- tial income through consultancies or private practice Figure 1
Distribution of income in USD purchasing power parity, with the increase from extra jobs, compared to distribution of poten-
tial income through consultancies or private practice
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This negative impact is also felt in indicators of health sta-
tus. There is an inverse relationship between indices of
corruption and ratio of public health spending to GDP
and child mortality rates [107]. As such, it cannot be
ignored by health sector managers, but labelling is not
only misleading and counterproductive: it also does not
help mobilize the coalitions necessary to address the
problem.
When compared with other sectors, health is frequently
classified as being of median to high levels of corruption,
with sectors such as public works contracts and construc-
tion, arms and defence, energy and industry appearing as
more corrupt [108].
The professional literature hardly touches on corruption
in the health sector. It is anecdotal (Yudkin reports, from
two Kenyan newspaper articles, that two ministry of
health officials had been bribed to purchase sufficient
quantities of two medicines made by one company to last
the nation for more than 10 years, whereas at least one of
the medicines would expire in two to three years) [109]
(see also Baxter, 1998) [110], biased, peripheral to the
core issues [22] or lacking in empirical data. Empirical
data are, nevertheless, available from a number of studies
and reports [16,18,21-23,105,110-113], most of which
were reviewed in previous sections.
One of the earlier papers on this was by Van Der Geest
[21]. It attempted to explain why health services in south-
ern Cameroon functioned so inefficiently, with special
attention to the distribution of medicines. It calculated
that the "elementary health centres received on the aver-
age about 65% of the medicines they should have
received", this proportion increasing for the "more devel-
oped health centres" and even more for the hospitals.
Once in the institutions, "many of the medicines which
finally arrive...and which should be distributed freely
among patients is taken by health personnel for private
use or distribution among friends and relatives. Medicines
are also sold to petty traders or directly to patients visiting
health workers in their private homes", resulting in a fur-
ther loss of medicines of 30% for health centres and of
40% for hospitals.
The main consequences of these practices were: underuti-
lization of health services known to be without medi-
cines; a very limited stock of medicines, which forced
health professionals to treat patients with inadequate
doses of medicines; referral of patients with prescriptions
to expensive private pharmacies; and an increase in ineq-
uity, as rural populations were clearly at a disadvantage
compared to urban populations. The author came to the
reluctant conclusion that the root cause of the observed
inefficiency was corruption, deeply embedded in socially
accepted practices of "gift-giving, with the preponderance
of traditional loyalties over obligations to the state, and
with a proprietary view of public offices".
The most important single factor encouraging corruption,
was, however, "the position of the state as the main source
of goods, services and employment and the relative
underdevelopment of the private commercial sector". In
the end Van Der Geest reluctantly acknowledged that
"suggestions to ameliorate the situation are hard to
make".
Reasons for dual practice
With current salary levels in many countries, it is surpris-
ing that many people remain in public service, when they
could earn much more in private practice. Dual practice
allows a standard of living that is closer to what clinical
doctors – still a rare resource in many situations – expect,
and thus helps retain valuable elements in public service.
Many spend comparatively little time, or none at all, on
private practice. It is unlikely that this is only for lack of
opportunities, such as a saturated private health care mar-
ket, or too much competition from the "real" clinicians.
There must be other sources of motivation to keep work-
ing in public services. The involvement in (relatively unre-
warding) teaching, or in unpaid NGO work shows that
other factors – social responsibility, self-realization, pro-
fessional satisfaction, working conditions and prestige –
still play a significant role [3,4,44,45]. A study from
Phnom Penh, Cambodia, suggests that the links with the
public sector are highly valued, as they give physicians
access to information, opinions of influential doctors,
recruitment of patients, privileges for treating and refer-
ring patients and an opportunity to make a contribution
to the community [89].
The gap between income and expectations makes it una-
voidable that managers, like other health care workers,
will seize opportunities that are rewarding, professionally
and financially. Some are of the opinion that dual practice
can at times be justified. Health workers in Mozambique
and Cape Verde rationalize it: "... to help a sick neigh-
bour" or to help patients "because there are patients that,
on account of the long waiting times, do not go to the hos-
pital, they will rather go to these persons in order to avoid
wasting their time in the hospitals" [20].
Most, however, implicitly or explicitly condemn such
practices while still attempting to explain and/or justify
them in various ways. An obvious explanation is that of
"serious lack of motivation" and insufficient salaries:
"economic reasons, and low salaries ... those are the rea-
sons ... it is a means of surviving" [20].Human Resources for Health 2004, 2:14 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/2/1/14
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The reasons for dual practice are not well studied. A
number of Portuguese case studies [72,74-76] suggest that
these reasons are contextual and vary between profes-
sional groups and site of employment (hospital versus
health centres). The extent of dual practice seems to vary
according to urban or rural residence, according to profes-
sional group (it is more common among health workers
with university degrees and, for these, more common for
doctors than for other professional groups) and within a
professional group, according to specialty or occupation.
For example, health system managers have fewer opportu-
nities for dual practice than clinicians.
This limited evidence suggests that being a migrant
worker, being on temporary contracts and doing shift
work are important determinants. This evidence is not
conclusive or generalizable, but is welcome as it suggests
that dual practice depends not so much on the personal
(age and sex), social (marital status) and professional
characteristics of health workers – although these are not
insignificant – but on factors that are manageable.
Sometimes dual practice may be the unexpected result of
health care reform. In Canada, within the public system,
designating sites for different levels of surgical acuity dur-
ing the early stages of regionalization has resulted in a 3.5-
fold increase in the number of surgeons working in more
than one setting after this restructuring compared to
before, as most surgeons do both high- and low-acuity
surgeries. This resulted in interference with continuity of
care, increased commuting time for both surgeons and
medical residents and increased reliance on house staff
(with whom surgeons spent less time and are thus less
familiar with the limits of their skills) [114].
Another area where provider strain was reported as high
was among paid home care staff: low wages, irregular
hours, inadequate training and high turnover resulted in
lack of continuity of care, staff shortages, waiting lists,
health risks to both workers and recipients and impover-
ishment. Some home workers reported working several
jobs to make ends meet [114].
Reforms frequently result in the increase of staff employed
on fixed term and temporary contracts [71]. This trend
seems to induce dual employment [72,74,75].
Interventions to deal with dual practice
At the core of the reliance on individual coping strategies,
including dual practice, is a very strong motor: the gap
between the professional's financial (but also social and
professional) expectations and what public service can
offer.
Most public responses to individual coping strategies,
including dual practice, fail to acknowledge the obvious:
that individual employees are reacting individually to the
failures of the organizations in which they work, and that
these de facto choices and decisions become part of what
the organization is.
Adequate responses also imply that the main underlying
reason for the observed dual practice can be identified.
They call for an understanding of how endemic are the
practices observed: Are they isolated, individual cases? Are
they specific to the health sector? Or are they widespread
in other sectors of society? It is equally important to iden-
tify the impact of these practices, particularly the impact
in terms of reduced access, inequity and other dangers for
the health of the public.
Dual practices have, in some countries, become so preva-
lent that it has been widely assumed that the very notion
of a civil service ethos has completely – and possibly
irreversibly – disappeared. But some of the literature
reviewed reflects, from the health workers themselves, a
conflict between what it means to be an honest civil serv-
ant who wants to do a decent job, and the brute facts of
life that make them betray that image. The manifest
unease that this provokes is an important observation as
such. It suggests that even in the difficult circumstances
observed in many countries, behaviours that depart from
traditional civil servant duty and ethics have not been
interiorized as a norm. This ambiguity suggests that
interventions to mitigate the erosion of proper conduct
would be welcome.
The most relevant conclusion is that there is no single rec-
ipe to address the reality of dual practice. Its cause and
logic vary, and the resulting differences among situations
need to be taken into account in the design of corrective
measures [115].
What does not work
Pretending that the problem does not exist or that it is a
question merely of individual ethics, or approaching it as
a problem merely of corruption, does not do justice to the
complex nature of the problem and will not make it go
away.
Prohibition is equally unlikely to meet with success, cer-
tainly if the salary scales remain blatantly insufficient. In
situations where it is difficult to keep staff performing ade-
quately for want of decent salaries and working condi-
tions, those who are supposed to enforce such a
prohibition are usually in the same situation as those who
have to be disciplined. As an isolated measure, restrictive
legislation, when not blatantly ignored, only drives dual
practice underground and makes it difficult to avoid orHuman Resources for Health 2004, 2:14 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/2/1/14
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correct negative effects [6]. Despite this, governments still
resort to prohibition as the main means of controlling
dual practice [116].
Closing the salary gap by raising public sector salaries to
"fair" levels may not be enough to break the vicious circle.
This was attempted by Louro, in Greece, in his restructur-
ing of the health sector in 1945. When public-sector doc-
tors were prohibited by law from pursuing private
practice, their average remuneration was raised to take
account of their lost income. But there was great resistance
by doctors not prepared to give up private practice and
professional autonomy [57]. The 1983 Greek NHS Act
again required doctors to have a heavily disputed exclu-
sive full-time status in their public sector employment;
correspondingly the hospital doctors' salaries were raised
so that seniority was favoured – at an average of 112%, or
at a range of 11% for junior doctors to almost 211% for
directors. Categories such as university and military doc-
tors escaped from the restrictions introduced.
The 1990–1994 reform again allowed doctors to become
part-timers if they wished to practice simultaneously in
private surgeries or to treat on a per-case basis, but in this
case their salaries would be reduced. Notably, though the
Ministry of Health expected that around 2500 doctors
would become part-timers, only 150 opted for it.
In 1994 an international committee chaired by Abel-
Smith reopened this issue, recommending that either
rights to private practice would be denied to all doctors
working for the NHS or they would be confined to senior
doctors for a limited number of sessions. Higher salaries
were to be paid to professors to compensate them for their
loss of unlimited private practice rights.
In 1997 this still had not been implemented [57]. And it
is not a realistic option in many poor countries. In the
average low-income country, salaries would have to be
multiplied by at least a factor of five to bring them to the
level of the income from a small private practice [44,45].
Doing this for all civil servants is unimaginable; doing it
only for selected groups would be politically difficult.
Downsizing central bureaucracies and delinking health
service delivery from civil service [117] would make it
possible to divide the salary mass among a smaller work-
force, leaving a better individual income for those who
remain. However, experience shows that such initiatives
often generate so much resistance among civil servants
that they never reach implementation [118]. Where
retrenchment becomes a reality it is rarely followed by
substantial salary increases, so that the problem remains
and the public sector is even less capable of assuming its
mission.
Lastly, a mere increase in salary would not automatically
reinstate the sense of purpose that is required to make
public services function: as such it would not be enough
to make moonlighting disappear spontaneously
[119,120]. That does not mean that nothing can be done.
Improvement is likely to come from a combination of
small piecemeal measures that rebuild a proper working
environment.
Addressing the problem of dual practice openly
A prerequisite is to address the problem of dual practice
openly. Where it is not realistic to expect health care work-
ers to dedicate 100% of their time to their public service
job, this should be acknowledged. That is the only way to
create the possibility of containing and discouraging
income-generating activities that present conflicts of
interest, in favour of safety valves with less potential for
negative impact on the functioning of the health services.
Besides minimizing conflicts of interest, open discussion
can diminish the feeling of unfairness among colleagues.
It then becomes possible to organize things in a more
transparent and predictable way.
There are indications that the newer generations of profes-
sionals have more modest expectations and are realistic
enough to see that the market for dual practice is finite
and to a large extent occupied by their elders. This gives
scope for the introduction of systems of incentives that are
coherent with the organization's social goals [121].
Incentives
Where, for example, financial compensation for work in
deprived areas is introduced in a context that provides a
clear sense of purpose and the necessary recognition, this
may help to reinstate lost civil service values [122]. The
same goes for the introduction of performance-linked
financial incentives [121]. These can, in principle, address
the problem of competition for working time, one of the
major drawbacks of dual practice. However, such
approaches require well-functioning and transparent
bureaucracies, making the countries most in need also
those where they are a priori most difficult to implement
on a large scale [117,123].
Improving working conditions
It makes no sense to expect health workers to perform well
in circumstances where the equipment and resources are
patently deficient. But improving working conditions
involves more than providing an adequate salary and the
right equipment. It also means developing career pros-
pects and providing perspectives for training [119,120].
Perhaps most important, it requires a social environment
that reinforces professional behaviour free from theHuman Resources for Health 2004, 2:14 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/2/1/14
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favouritism and arbitrariness prevalent in the public sec-
tor of many countries.
Professional value systems
However ill-defined they may be, the value systems of the
professionals are a major determinant in making the dif-
ference between good service to the public and bad. It
would be naïve to think this could be achieved through
mere bureaucratic regulation by governments or donor
agencies. With the building up of pressure from donors
and from peers as well as from users, civil servant health
professionals will be more likely to invest in patterns of
behaviours and practices that visibly uphold the profes-
sional value system [119,120].
Peer pressure
The social and professional culture within a profession
may have a major impact on the practice [64,120,121].
Peer influence, building on the concept of group respon-
sibility for self-education and monitoring, as well as
multi-component interventions, have been shown to be
effective in improving professional practice in the public
sector of high-income countries [124,125].
The effect of peer pressure may be positive or negative.
Pressure from local practice styles is particularly relevant
in situations where there is the most uncertainty concern-
ing the most appropriate treatment protocol [85]. This
reflects the practice-styles hypothesis of Wenberg and col-
leagues in 1982 [126].
Practice styles can be changed through "peer influence
meetings", particularly if the change is seen as building up
public reputation and status, once more showing that
simple income topping-up is not the principal driving
force of professional behaviour [127]. This points to the
importance, in the absence of effective regulatory mecha-
nisms, of the role of professional societies in ensuring
peer-pressure mechanisms to reduce undesirable coping
strategies associated with dual practice.
A further possibility is workers' forming peer pressure
groups to reduce undesirable coping strategies associated
with dual practice. These groups could function to sup-
port members to maintain their personal stance as well as
to inform the public of their rights. Making public the
membership of such a group could be a way of identifying
the non-members, an indirect way of increasing pressure
[23].
A significant problem with individual coping strategies
associated with dual practice is the difficulty of assigning
individual responsibilities in situations where these are
endemic. In these circumstances it might be relevant to
introduce legislation that makes the head of an organiza-
tion or department legally responsible for the actions of
that body. This would be a further means of increasing
peer pressure and accountability [23].
Pressure from users
Civil society has a particularly important role, specifically
in linking reform measures to the experiences and expec-
tations of real people. But civil society must not be seen as
a neutral body, particularly in developing countries where
patron–client networks or kinship networks have a strong
influence on the state and on the patterns of corruption
and/or of coping strategies observed. In these situations
the reform of civil society itself should be an objective of
the interventions to correct such strategies.
In many countries, users/clients/patients are not protected
against the consequences of the asymmetry of informa-
tion they face – with health and financial consequences.
From the history of the workers' movement in Europe and
as the recent evolution in a number of middle-income
countries – such as Thailand's National Forum on Health
Care Reform [128] – points out, perhaps the most effec-
tive way to help the State regulate professional practice is
to increase pressure from civil society. (Fear of malpractice
may have a paradoxical effect in that may result in exces-
sive and inappropriate recourse to caesarean sections, for
example [85,129].)
Creating opportunities for users to voice their discontent
effectively implies that patient's rights must be clear, chan-
nels for complaints must be simple, regulatory agencies
must be strong and trusted by the public, processes must
be explicit and transparent and the judiciary system must
be strengthened [23].
Recruitment practices
International development agencies, even when they do
not have formal, explicit policies regarding dual practice,
have become more sensitized to the problem over recent
years. This has resulted in a number of recommendations
to help minimize the problem. To limit the brain drain
due to their own employment policies, organizations
such as the World Bank, Norwegian Agency for
Development Cooperation (NORAD), German Technical
Cooperation (GTZ) or the World Health Organization in
principle implement human resources recruitment poli-
cies that emphasize the employment of task-specific and
short-term consultants, with a commitment of national
institutions to retain such staff [90-92,130].
Regulating the private sector
The anti-corruption literature, without the necessary
empirical evidence to support such claims, actually
blames government monopoly of service provision as one
of the key determinants of the emergence of some of theHuman Resources for Health 2004, 2:14 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/2/1/14
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coping strategies reviewed above [105]. It has also been
argued that the presence of a significant quasi-private sys-
tem operating within the public sector, i.e. the form of
dual practice most common in transitional economies
and in developing countries, is detrimental to the devel-
opment of a strong private sector [23].
The claims for a greater role for the private sector in the
provision of health care are based on a number of
assumptions that are not all based on empirical evidence
and ignore that private practice, in most developing coun-
tries, is notoriously unregulated. The fragmentary evi-
dence shows that blanket recommendations regarding the
role of the private sector are inappropriate [131].
There is a case for public sector support of the private sec-
tor where this serves the public's interest and allows redi-
rection of scarce resources. If that is not the case, support
has no rationale. Support, but also mere control, carries
costs for the public sector administrative machinery. The
costs of the "new" state responsibilities must be compen-
sated for by savings resulting from gains in efficiency and
from complementarity [124,131,132].
A key policy question is whether doctors should be
allowed to work in both the public and private sectors. As
discussed before, prohibition is unlikely to be effective.
The real issue is what types of private practice should be
allowed in order to minimize conflicts of interest, and
what forms of regulatory mechanisms can be introduced
to isolate coping strategies that are associated mostly with
lack of regulation rather than just with low income [23].
It seems that efforts should be undertaken to ensure mul-
tiple and independent channels of accountability, by
means of penalties for not satisfying contractual obliga-
tions, through channels of accountability to professional
councils and associations and to the public.
Regulation is one important factor influencing the coping
strategies that result from the interface with the private
sector [62,124]. Even when regulations exist, effective
enforcement mechanisms are often absent in low- and
middle-income countries [125,133]. Therefore, good leg-
islation is not enough. The state must have the means to
enforce it. In India, for example, private clinics and
mobile teams promote prenatal sex determination by
advertising in local newspapers, in spite of government
prohibition of the practice [134].
Pressure on donors
International collaboration is seen as particularly impor-
tant regarding the support of international development
agencies for actions such as: good-governance interven-
tions in specific domains; supporting methods to curb
corruption, including policy dialogue, capacity building,
documentation and analysis of best practices and support
to national programmes; and making reformers aware of
the importance of country conditions in programme
development [115].
Anti-corruption strategies have also been approached by
donors with different objectives: to reduce poverty, to
improve the functioning of democratic institutions, to
sustain economic development, political stability and
social justice. The lesson for the management of coping
strategies and dual practice is that international collabora-
tion cannot be neglected, as donors may be important
inducers of coping strategies and dual practice as well as
essential partners in the search for solutions.
One way to increase donors' and governments' commit-
ment to deal with the causes of individual coping strate-
gies as well as dual practice might be to include a formal
"human resources impact assessment" as a condition for
the approval of health projects or components of sector-
wide approaches. This could force governments and their
partners to face the problems caused by dual practice
before it becomes part of the public organization's cul-
ture. This would not be a guarantee that it would be effec-
tively dealt with, but might limit the damage [135].
Conclusions
In terms of sector location, dual practice may be public-
on-public, public-on-private or private-on-private. Dual
practice is probably present in all countries regardless of
income, even in settings where there are major regulatory
restrictions, such as China.
Dual practice may lead to predatory behaviour by health
workers. This constitutes, in many cases, a de facto finan-
cial barrier to access to health care. It delegitimizes public
sector health service delivery and jeopardizes the neces-
sary relation of trust between user and provider. Clini-
cians in dual practice have to compete for patients with
themselves, which is an incentive to lower the quality of
the care they provide in the public services.
Dual practice contributes also to brain drain, specifically
public-to-private brain drain. If public sector medical staff
is moonlighting in private practice, this limits access.
Besides competition for time, in many cases, the use of the
public sector's means of transportation, office infrastruc-
ture and personnel represent additional hidden outflows
of resources, often in association with dual practice.
This is not the case for managers: involvement in NGO
projects or work for donors can foster better coordination
in the provision of services, but may constitute a conflict
of interest when NGO or project policies are not necessar-Human Resources for Health 2004, 2:14 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/2/1/14
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ily congruent with national health policies or the agenda
of the public service.
On the other hand, dual practice allows professionals a
standard of living that is closer to what they expect, as well
as a standard of practice closer to their own perceptions of
good professional practice, resulting in higher profes-
sional satisfaction.
There is no evidence that dual practice by public sector
health professionals complements public practice or pro-
motes greater equity of health care distribution.
The reasons for dual practice are contextual. The extent of
dual practice seems to vary according to urban or rural res-
idence, according to professional group (more common
among health workers with university degrees and, for
these, more common for doctors than for other profes-
sional groups) and even within a professional group,
according to specialty or occupation. The limited evidence
suggests that being a migrant worker, being on temporary
contracts and doing shift work are important determi-
nants. This evidence suggests that dual practice depends
not so much on the personal (age and sex), social (marital
status) and professional characteristics of health workers,
although these are not insignificant, but on factors that
are manageable.
Sometimes dual practice may be the unexpected result of
health care reform. Reforms frequently result in the
increase of staff employed on fixed-term and temporary
contracts. This trend seems to encourage dual
employment.
Therefore, at the core of the reliance on dual practice is the
gap between the professional's expectations and what
public service can offer. Adequate responses imply the
identification of the main underlying reason for the
observed dual practice. The most relevant conclusion is
that there is no single recipe to address the reality of dual
practice.
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